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THE REPRESENTATIVE POWER OF THE
SHAREHOLDERS’ GENERAL MEETING UNDER
CHINESE LAW
Charles Zhen Qu†
Abstract: Under China’s company law regime, the power to represent the
company resides not in the board of directors but in an individual person called a legal
representative (fading daibiaoren) who is a senior officer of the company. The
mechanism of legal representative, however, is often rendered ineffective as it is
inherently susceptible to abuse. The mechanism becomes dysfunctional when the legal
representative is unavailable. The legal representative’s unavailability, especially when
the board of directors is also ineffective, raises the question of whether the general
meeting has the power to control corporate actions. To answer this question, this Article
considers the legal nature of the legal representative’s role, examines the allocation of the
company’s decisionmaking and representative powers, and reviews a small corpus of
recent cases which have been or could have been decided on the basis of the general
meeting’s power of representation. This Article argues that the legal representative
should be regarded as an agent rather than as an organ of the company, and a company’s
general meeting should be able to exercise the company’s decision-making and
representative power when both the board of directors and the legal representative are
ineffective, given the nature of the legal representative’s role and the power allocation
under the company law regime in China.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A company’s ability to conduct proceedings is crucial to the protection
of its interests and the interests of its stakeholders. It is, therefore, important
to ensure that the company will be able to maintain its litigation competence
at all times and in all circumstances. A company, as a legal abstraction, must
act through natural persons.1 Under China’s civil law2 and company law
regimes, the power to represent the company is not vested in the board3 but
in an individual person, termed the legal representative.4 The legal
†
B.A. (East China Normal University); L.L.B., L.L.M. (University of New South Wales); Ph.D
(Australian National University); Assistant Professor, Law School, City University of Hong Kong. The
author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments made on earlier drafts of this Article by Mr. Stefan
Lo.
1
PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 129 (Sweet &
Maxwell 7th ed. 2003).
2
The phrase “civil law” is used here to mean the law of civil or private rights rather than the
Western European system of codified laws.
3
See infra text accompanying notes 54-56. There are exceptions in some specified circumstances.
4
In contrast, a company incorporated in a common law jurisdiction normally acts through two
groups of individuals, namely, the board of directors and the shareholders’ general meeting. The board of
directors is, in ordinary circumstances, granted the power to manage the affairs of the company, which
includes the power to represent the company in corporate proceedings. See DAVIES, supra note 1, at 294;
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representative represents the company, as a legal person,5 to exercise its
powers in accordance with the law and the constitution of the legal person.6
The legal representative of a company is normally the chairperson of the
board of directors, or if the company does not have a board, the executive
director or company manager.7 The legal representative’s appointment must
be approved by and registered with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce
Administration (“BICA”), the government department responsible for
company registration.
The mechanism of the legal representative, however, is often rendered
inefficient because it is inherently susceptible to abuse. The mechanism
becomes ineffective when the legal representative who is capable of
faithfully implementing decisions of the company is unavailable. The
requirement that the BICA approve and register the legal representative
often creates circumstances where the company does not have a legal
representative, for example, in circumstances where a legal representative is
dismissed and the BICA does not complete approval and registration of the
replacement legal representative. The previous legal representative whose
name still appears on the BICA’s registry before the re-registration is
complete has opportunities to take unauthorized actions against the interests
of the company.8 The representative is also unavailable when the legal
representative decides not to act or to act inconsistently with the
shareholders’ interests. Because the power of representation is vested in a
single person, the legal representative often has opportunities to take
unauthorized transactional or litigational actions in the name of the
company. These actions are often tainted with conflicts of interests or

G. D. Goldberg, Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act 1948, 33 MOD. L. REV. 177, 180-81 (1970);
Ross Grantham, The Reserve Powers of Company Shareholders, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 36, 36-39 (2004).
5
A legal person is “[a]n entity on which a legal system confers rights and imposes duties.”
BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY 680 (1997).
6
General Code of the Civil Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr.
12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 38, translated in STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1985-86, at 3 [hereinafter General Code of the Civil Law].
7
See JIAN FU & JIE YUAN, PRC COMPANY & SECURITIES LAWS–A PRACTICAL GUIDE 41-42 (2006).
A limited liability company shall appoint a manager to manage the day-to-day business of the company to
implement the decisions of the board of directors. Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 50, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited
Aug. 11, 2007) (P.R.C.). Similarly, a company limited by shares is required to appoint a manager to
manage the day-to-day business of the company to implement the decisions of the board of directors. Id.
art. 114.
8
Shen Li, You gu dong hui jue ding de fa ding dai biao ren ying ju you gong si de su song dai biao
quan [The Legal Representative Appointed by the General Meeting Should Have Power of Representation]
(Shanghai
Mun.
First
Interm.
People’s
Ct.),
http://www.companylawyer.com.cn/
gdqy/zxgdqydbh/20051215113225.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2007).
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fraud.9 A legal representative, for example, will hardly ever be willing to
implement the company’s decision to sue that legal representative.
There have long been calls to abolish the legal representative system
in China.10 However, after considering the aforementioned calls for its
abolition, lawmakers in the 2005 amendment to China’s Company Law11
(“2005 Company Law”) reaffirmed the role of the legal representative,
making its abolition unrealistic in the near future.12 To live with this system
of representation, it is necessary to find ways to remedy the deficiencies of
the system in a principled manner and consistent with legal doctrine. This
Article first suggests that the legal representative should be regarded as an
agent, rather than an organ, of the company. Then, when the legal
representative becomes dysfunctional for any number of reasons, the
company’s general meeting should be permitted to exercise the company’s
decision-making and representative power for the company.
The remainder of this Article is organized into four parts. Part II
charts the development of the company law regime in China. Part III
provides an overview and background of the 2005 Company Law and its
salient features regarding a company’s governance structure. Part IV
examines the role of the legal representative. Part V considers the
circumstances in which, and the doctrinal bases on which, the general
meeting has been, or should have been, given power to represent the
company in litigation.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPANY LAW

China’s first company law legislation was promulgated by the late
Qing Dynasty in 1904 for the purpose of competing against the foreign

9
See Yang Ji, Zhongguo gu fen gong si fa ding dai biao ren zhi du de zun fei [The Regime of Legal
Representative for China’s Joint Stock Companies: To Preserve or to Abolish?], 26(6) XIAN DAI FA XUE
[MODERN LAW SCIENCE] 125, 127 n.1 (2004).
10
See id. at 125; Gu Minkang, Gong si fa ding dai biao ren de bi jiao yan jiu [Comparative
Research on the Company Legal Representative], 1 HUA DONG ZHENG FA XUE YUAN XUE BAO [EAST CHINA
COLLEGE OF LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE JOURNAL] 49 (1998); Xu Yanbing, Fa ding dai biao ren zhi du
de bi duan ji wan shan [The Deficiency and Perfection of the Legal Representative System], 7 FA XUE [LAW
SCIENCE] 10 (2004).
11
Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005,
effective Jan. 1, 2006), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 25, 2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2005
Company Law].
12
Id. art. 13. This decision was based on the consideration that the legal representative practice had
already become a custom in the company law practice in China, and a good faith mechanism controlling
company transactions was yet to be built up. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK
COMMITTEE, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONG SI FA SHI YI [P.R.C. COMPANY LAW COMMENTARY]
33 (Law Press 2005) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE].
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enterprises present in China.13 The legislation was based on the 1856 Joint
Stock Companies Act of the United Kingdom and the Commercial Code of
Japan.14 The company law statute of the Qing era was hardly used until the
Qing Dynasty was overthrown in 1912.15 Two years later, the government of
the Republic of China promulgated Company Regulations using the
structure of Japan’s Commercial Code.16 In 1929, the Nanjing Nationalist
government continued the reform by enacting a new piece of legislation, the
Company Law.17 This statute went on to become the foundation of Taiwan’s
Company Code.18
The 1929 Company Law became invalid in October 1949 when the
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) was established.19 Between 1949 and
1979, no official company legislation was enacted.20 In 1979, after adopting
the open door policy, the PRC enacted the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture
Enterprises Law (“EJV Law”),21 which governed the formation and
operation of Sino-foreign equity joint venture companies.22 The EJV Law
was enacted in response to the perceived urgent need for a predictable legal
framework that would help foreign investors to invest in China.
In contrast, the need to enact a domestic company law was less urgent,
given that most of the companies at that stage were state-owned or
collectively-owned enterprises.23 Between 1979 and 1993, the PRC enacted
numerous statutes and regulations regulating foreign investment and
domestic company activities. In 1993, the PRC enacted the Company Law
(“1993 Company Law”),24 the first company legislation applicable to
domestic companies.25 By the end of the last century, it became clear that
13
Louisa Lam & Lin Ketong, Corporate Governance, in 1 CHINA COMPANY LAW GUIDE ¶ 160-110,
¶ 160-120 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2004).
14
Graham Brown & Wei Xin, Introduction to Company Law, in 1 CHINA COMPANY LAW GUIDE,
supra note 13, ¶ 10-110, ¶ 10-120. Brown & Wei Xin refer to the 1856 Act as “the British Company Law
of 1856,” although it is generally referenced as the Joint Stock Companies Act.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. ¶ 10-130.
20
Id. Cf. id. (discussing a small number of regulations issued to regulate privately ownedenterprises during the relevant period, including Provisional Regulations on Privately Owned Enterprises
1950, and relationships among state-owned enterprises, such as Regulations on the Working Relations
Between State-Owned Manufacturing Enterprises (Draft) 1961).
21
Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective July 8, 1979), translated in 1 P.R.C. LAWS 150.
22
Brown & Wei Xin, supra note 14, ¶ 10-130.
23
Id.
24
Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993,
effective July 1, 1994), translated in 5 P.R.C. LAWS 269 [hereinafter 1993 Company Law].
25
See Brown & Wei Xin, supra note 14, ¶ 10-140.
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the 1993 Company Law was inadequate and had become an impediment to
China’s economic reform.26 This led to a minor revision of the 1993
Company Law in 199927 and a major amendment in 2005.28 The 2005
Company Law came into effect on January 1, 2006.29
III.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE 2005 COMPANY LAW AND THE SALIENT
FEATURES OF THE COMPANY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE THEREIN

A.

The Structure of the Company Law

The 2005 Company Law regulates the incorporation, governance, and
operation of two types of companies: limited liability companies and
companies limited by shares.30 These two types of companies are roughly
equivalent to what are termed “private companies” and “public companies”
recognized under the company legislation of commonwealth jurisdictions.31
B.

Salient Features of the Governance Structure

The governance structure under the 2005 Company Law features the
following five salient characteristics.
1.

A Company Functions Through Three Organs

A company in China, regardless of its type, normally has three
corporate organs:32 the shareholders’ general meeting, the board of
directors, and the supervisory board.33 Critics contend that a company may
have a company manager34 and the company’s legal representative as a

26
Craig Anderson & Bingna Guo, Corporate Governance Under the New Company Law (Part 1):
Fiduciary Duties and Minority Shareholder Protection, in CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 2006, at 17-18. The
inadequacy of the 2003 Company Law manifested in weak shareholder protection and a lack of civil
enforcement mechanisms. The need for reform of the Company Law became clear when China
experienced a number of high profile corporate scandals in the years immediately antecedent to the 2005
revision of the Company Law. Id. at 18.
27
Brown & Wei Xin, supra note 14, ¶ 12-120.
28
FU & JIE YUAN, supra note 7, at 5.
29
See 2005 Company Law, supra note 11.
30
See id. chs. II, IV.
31
See id. On classifications of companies in common law jurisdictions, see DAVIES, supra note 1, at
12; H. A. J. FORD, ROBERT P. AUSTIN & IAN M. RAMSAY, FORD’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 14849 (12th ed. 2005).
32
See infra text accompanying note 68 for a discussion on the meaning of the word “organ.”
33
See 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, ch. II, § 2, ch. IV, §§ 2-4.
34
See, e.g., Lam & Lin Ketong, supra note 13, ¶ 163-520.
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fourth or even fifth organ.35 Where the scope of business or the number of
shareholders is relatively small, however, the company may have one
executive director instead of a board of directors, and one or two supervisors
in lieu of a supervisory board.36
2.

Corporate Powers Are Statutorily Allocated

Under the 2005 Company Law, the general meeting is regarded as the
company’s power organ.37 The powers of the general meeting include the
power to determine the company’s management policies and investment
plans; appoint and dismiss directors and supervisors while determining the
remuneration of the directors and supervisors; examine and approve reports
prepared by the directors and supervisors; and examine the budget plan,
accounting plan, and distribution plan.38 The general meeting also has
control over the board of directors,39 as well as power to amend the
company’s constitution, change the amount of the company’s registered
capital, and issue debt securities.40 The shareholders’ general meeting forms
the company’s will and intention in the sense that the most important matters
of the company are determined by the general meeting.41
The board of directors is the company’s executive organ.42 It manages
the company by exercising its powers in formulating various types of
business plans, implementing the general meeting’s resolutions, determining
the company’s internal management structure, and appointing management
and financial staff.43 The board reports to the general meeting and must
implement the resolutions of the general meeting.44 The board has the
power, upon a request by the shareholders in writing, to bring actions against
35
See, e.g., JIANG PING ET AL., XIN BIAN GONG SI FA JIAO CHENG [A NEW TEXTBOOK ON COMPANY
LAW] 68 (1994).
36
See 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 51, 52.
37
See id. art. 37.
38
Id. arts. 38, 100.
39
See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
40
2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 38, 100.
41
WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, ZHONGGUO GONG SI FA YUAN LI [PRINCIPLES OF CHINA’S
COMPANY LAW] 47, 189-91, 194-95 (1998); JIANG PING ET AL., supra note 35, at 138. See also SHI
SHAOXIA, GONGSIFA [COMPANY LAW] 102 (1996); GAO CHENGDE & XIAO ZHIHE, ZHONGGUO GONG SI FA
SHI WU [PRACTICE IN CHINA’S COMPANIES] 34 (1994).
42
This is not expressly provided in the 2005 Company Law. However, the Legal System Working
Committee of China’s Parliament, the National People’s Congress, states in its interpretation of the 2005
Company Law that the board of directors is a compulsory, permanent management decision-making organ
of the company. See THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE, supra note
12, at 73.
43
2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 47; WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, supra note 41, at 114,
211-12.
44
2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 47.
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an errant member of the supervisory board if the company has suffered a
loss because of the defaulting supervisor’s breach of law, regulations, or the
company’s constitution.45 The board of directors forms the company’s
management will and intention.46
The supervisory board is the company’s supervisory organ. It
supervises the activities of the board of directors.47 It has the power to
examine the financial affairs of the company and to make recommendations
about the removal of directors or senior executives48 who have breached the
law, administrative regulations, the company’s constitution, or the
resolutions of the general meeting. The board also has the power to bring
legal action against directors or senior executives upon the request of a
shareholder if the company has suffered a loss because of these officers’
breach of the law, administrative regulations, or the company’s
constitution.49 The supervisory board forms the company’s supervisory will
and intention in the sense that the board makes the decision to remove—or
to commence proceedings against—defaulting directors or senior officers.50
3.

No General Power of Management Is Granted to the Board of
Directors

The powers that the 2005 Company Law allocates to the three
corporate organs are all specific. Unlike in common law jurisdictions, the
2005 Company Law allocates no general power of management to the board
of directors.51 The power allocation provisions in company constitutions
tend to be identical or similar to the power allocation provisions of the 2005
Company Law.52
45

Id. art. 152. See also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, supra note 41, at 114, 211-12; SHI SHAOXIA, supra note 41, at 232.
Note, however, that the directors are subject to the absolute control of the general meeting. They have a
statutory obligation to implement the resolutions of the general meeting. 2005 Company Law, supra note
11, arts. 47(2), 109.
47
2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 54, 119.
48
“Senior officers” is defined to mean the company manager, the deputy manager, the chief finance
officer, the secretary of a listed company, and other people defined as senior officers in the company’s
constitution. Id. art. 217.
49
Id. arts. 54(6), 150, 152. The supervisory board was not given the power to sue delinquent
directors under the 1993 Company Law.
50
See 1993 Company Law, supra note 24, arts 48, 126; 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 54,
55, 119, 152.
51
In common law jurisdictions, the power of managing the business of the company is normally
vested in the board of directors by virtue of a division of power regulation in the company’s constitution.
FORD ET AL., supra note 31, at 216; Charles Zhen Qu, Some Reflections on the General Meeting’s Power to
Control Corporate Proceedings, 36(3) COMMON L. WORLD REV. 231, 232 (2007).
52
See, e.g., Guang gao jing ying gong si zhang cheng [the model company constitution for an
advertising company], CHINALAWINFO (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.); see also ZUI XIN JING BIAN
46
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The General Meeting Has Ultimate Control

The general meeting is in a position to control the board of directors.
The board is obliged to implement the resolutions of the general meeting,
and a director who refuses to do so may be removed.53 Even though this
feature of the general meeting has already been stated above, it should be
stressed here again because of its central importance when considering the
general meeting’s litigational representative power.
5.

The Representative Power Resides in the Legal Representative

Under the General Code of the Civil Law of the PRC (“GCCL”),54
which is China’s provisional civil code, a legal person exercises its powers
through its “legal representative.”55 Under the 2005 Company Law, the
legal representative of a company represents the company by entering into
transactions and prosecuting proceedings on behalf of the company in
normal circumstances.56 However, the aforementioned litigational powers of
the board of directors and supervisory board57 supplement the representative
power of the legal representative.
The adoption of the legal representative mechanism was not based on
any doctrinal considerations. In fact, this mechanism originated from the
former Soviet Union.58 This system was first adopted in the revolutionary
bases before the founding of the PRC in 1949 to ensure the productive
efficiency of, and the party’s leadership in, the war industry.59 Since 1949,
state-owned enterprises have used the system.60 The notion of the legal
representative was codified for the first time in 1979 when the EJV Law
Implementation Rules were enacted.61 Rule 37 of the Implementation Rules
provides that the chairperson of an EJV company is the legal representative

ZHONGGUO GONG SI FA SHI WU QUAN SHU [THE LATEST ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINESE COMPANY LAW
PRACTICE] 200-07 (1994); QI YE GAI ZHI BING GOU FA LÜ SHI WU [LEGAL PRACTICE ON ENTERPRISE
RECONSTRUCTION AND MERGER] 342 (2006), and GONG SI ZHANG CHENG FAN BEN DA QUAN [A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF MODEL COMPANY CONSTITUTIONS] (Zhongtian Law Electronic Press CD-ROM, 2006).
53
2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 47(2), 54(2), 109.
54
China does not have a comprehensive civil code yet. The General Code of the Civil Law serves as
a provisional civil code. See generally General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6.
55
Id. art. 38.
56
2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 13.
57
See supra text accompanying notes 45, 49.
58
Yang Ji, supra note 9, at 125.
59
Id.
60
Id. See also Gu Minkang, supra note 10, at 49; WANG LIMING, ZHONGGUO MIN FA DIAN CAO AN
JIAN YI GAO JI SHUO MING [A DRAFT CIVIL CODE OF CHINA AND EXPLANATORY NOTE] 295-96 (2004).
61
Yang Ji, supra note 9, at 125.
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of that company.62 The concept of the legal representative was subsequently
adopted in the GCCL63 and in the 1993 Company Law.64 As previously
noted,65 the concept and functions of the legal representative were kept
intact under the 2005 Company Law.
IV.

THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IN CORPORATE
PROCEEDINGS

The way in which the legal representative is conceptualized affects
and changes the options available to the company when no legal
representative is available or the legal representative is ineffective. When
the legal representative conducts proceedings in the name of the company,
the representative acts either as the company itself or as the company’s
agent. The legal representative can be regarded as the company itself only if
the individual can be conceptualized as one of the company’s organs. This
section suggests that the legal representative should be viewed as an agent
rather than an organ of the company.
A.

Is the Legal Representative an Organ of the Company?

Neither the 2005 Company Law nor the GCCL contains express
provisions on the nature of the relationship between the company and its
legal representative. Article 38 of the GCCL provides that the legal
representative is the person responsible for representing a legal person in the
exercise of their rights and powers (zhiquan) in accordance with statutory
provisions or provisions of the legal person’s constitution.66 Article 13 of
the 2005 Company Law stipulates the types of company officers who may
be appointed as the company’s legal representative.67 Neither Article 38 nor
Article 13, however, refers to the capacity in which the legal representative
represents the company to exercise its rights and powers. Most scholars of
Chinese company law and civil law seem to agree that the legal
representative, like the shareholders’ general meeting, the board of directors,
and the board of supervisors, functions as an organ rather than as an agent of

62
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures
(promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 20, 1983), art. 34, translated in http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064563.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (P.R.C.).
63
General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 38.
64
1993 Company Law, supra note 24, arts. 45, 113.
65
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
66
General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 38.
67
2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 13.
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the company. 68 None of them, however, has defined the meaning of “organ”
or has based their claims on any proper legal authorities.
Most common law jurisdictions define corporate organs as certain
groups of people in whom the company law vests an original authority to
commit the company to the legal consequences of the decisions made for it
or to delegate to others.69 According to this definition, the corporate organs
of a company mean the board of directors and the general meeting.70 The
Chinese judiciary seems to accept this conception of a corporate organ. For
example, the Beijing Higher People’s Court expresses the view in its
company law adjudication guidelines that board and general meeting
resolutions constitute corporate acts.71 According to this notion of a
corporate organ, however, the legal representative cannot be regarded as a
corporate organ.72 The 2005 Company Law does not vest any power in the
representative to commit the company or make any corporate decisions. The
legal representative must act according to the will and intention of the
company,73 which are formed in normal circumstances by the general
meeting, the board of directors, and the board of supervisors.74
Admittedly, a limited liability company, in practice, may authorize
through its constitution the chairperson of the board of directors, or the
executive director where the company does not have a board, to make
decisions on transactions if their amount does not exceed a certain limit.75
However, this practice does not mean that the legal representative is granted
decision-making power in relation to litigation matters. The 2005 Company
Law is silent on the location of decision-making powers with respect to
litigation. If a company’s management will and intention is formed by the
board of directors,76 and if the power to litigate falls within the general

68
JIANG PING ET AL., supra note 35; ZHOU YOUFEN, XIN GONGSIFA LUN [A NEW SURVEY ON
CORPORATION LAW] 80-81 (2006). See also PENG WANLIN, TAN YOUTU & LI KAIGUO, MIN FA XUE [CIVIL
LAW] 136 (China University of Political Science and Law Press 2002); MINFAXUE [CIVIL LAW] 250 (Jiang
Ping ed., China University of Political Science and Law Press 2000); WEI ZHENYING, MINFA [CIVIL LAW]
170 (Peaking University Press 2000).
69
FORD ET AL., supra note 31, at 212. See also DAVIES, supra note 1, at 178.
70
FORD ET AL., supra note 31, at 212.
71
Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan guan yu shen li gong si jiu fen an jian ruo gan wen ti de zhi dao
yi jian [Some Guiding Opinions of Beijing Higher People’s Court on the Trial of Company Law Cases],
(Beijing High People’s Ct., Feb. 24, 2004） LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.).
72
But see supra text accompanying notes 47-50 (China’s company law regime regards the
supervisory board as one of the company’s organs).
73
WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, supra note 41, at 47-48.
74
See supra text accompanying notes 41, 46, and 50.
75
Interview with Jiang Da Xing, Professor, Nanjing University of Law School (Aug. 20, 2007).
76
See supra text accompanying notes 42, 46.
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power of management,77 then normally the power to make decisions about
litigation should reside in the board of directors.78
In addition, the possibility for the company to delegate power to an
executive officer to commit the company for certain transactional purposes
does not mean that the legal representative is an organ of the company.
When a company officer is appointed as the company’s legal representative
and has been granted the power to make a transactional decision, that power
lies in the officer’s capacity as the company’s executive officer (if the
individual is the board chairperson or the company manager) or the
company’s executive organ (if the individual is the company’s executive
director where the company does not have a board),79 not the officer’s
capacity as the company’s legal representative. The 2005 Company Law
does not confer any decision-making powers on the legal representative.80
If the word “organ” is used to describe the legal representative as the
implementation organ for the company’s decisions, then the usage of that
word becomes conceptually inconsequential. Such usage cannot prevent the
legal representative from being recognized as an agent of either the company
or a company organ in which the power to commit the company is vested.
B.

Can the Legal Representative Be Treated as an Agent of the
Company?

The GCCL defines an agent (daili) as a person who performs civil
juristic acts in the name of the principal within the scope of the granted
authority.81 A civil juristic act is a legitimate act of a person or a legal
person to establish, change, or terminate civil rights or obligations.82 The

77

There is a consensus among common law courts that the power to litigate falls within the general
power of management. See Breckland Group Holding Ltd. v. London and Suffolk Properties Ltd., (1989) 4
B.C.C. 542 (Ch.); Mitchell & Hobbs (U.K.) Ltd. v. Mill, (1996) 2 B.C.L.C. 102 (Q.B.); Massey v. Wales;
Massey v. Cooney, (2003) 47 A.C.S.R. 1 (Austl.).
78
This is indeed the opinion of the Legal System Working Committee of the National People’s
Congress, although the view on the board of directors’ power to litigate is expressed in a special context
(where a need for suing a defaulting member of the supervisory board arises). THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 218. The supervisory board’s power to
litigate where the alleged defendant is a director is apparently provided to address the concern that the
board of directors is often reluctant to sue their board colleagues. See J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 237-38 (1993).
79
The executive director of a company that does not have a board of directors constitutes the
executive organ of the company. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE,
supra note 12, at 218.
80
See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
81
General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 63.
82
Id. art. 54.

306

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 2

principal is responsible for the liability that the agent has incurred within the
scope of the individual’s authority.83
Under the GCCL definition, the kind of service that an agent performs
on behalf of the principal is restricted to civil juristic acts.84 The concept of
agency, however, can be broadly understood. If a person confers power on
another to engage in activities with legal consequences, in so far as the
former is bound by the legal consequence of the act done by the latter on the
former’s behalf,85 the latter can be arguably viewed as the agent of the
former, even if the act done on behalf of the former does not amount to a
civil juristic act.86
There is no problem in considering the legal representative as an agent
of the company for transactional purposes even under the definition
provided in the GCCL. The legal representative represents the legal person,
the company, to exercise its powers granted by the law, including the power
to do civil juristic acts.87 The liability incurred within the scope of the legal
representative’s business activities is attributable to the legal person or the
company.88 To the extent that the power of the legal representative is
exercised to perform civil juristic acts, there is no conceptual problem in
treating the legal representative as an agent of the legal person.
In fact, the legal representative is viewed as an agent in China’s civil
law framework. An example is Article 50 of the PRC Contract Law, which
provides that the legal person will not be bound to a contract entered into on
its behalf where the legal representative has exceeded the limit of his or her
authority if the other party to the contract knew or ought to have known

83

Id. art. 63.
Id.
85
It is is a basic tenet of agency law in both civil law and common law jurisdictions that the
principal is bound to the legal consequence of the act done by her agent who acted within the scope of her
authority. On the position in civil law jurisdictions, see MINPŌ, arts. 99-101, translated in MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (TRANSLATION) (1972); Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code]
Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 164-66 (F.R.G.). On the common law side, see F.M.B.
REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 1, 303 (Sweet & Maxwell 17th ed. 2001); W.A.
Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 869 (1920).
86
See LIANG HUIXING, MINFA ZONGLUN [GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW] 251-52 (2d ed.
2001); MU XIAOYUAN, DAI LI FA LI LUN YU SHI WU [THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY] 4, 14 (East China University of Science and Technology Press 1998).
87
General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 38.
88
General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 43; Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu guan che
zhi xing “zhong hua ren min gong he guo min shi fa tong ze” ruo gan wen ti de yi jian (shi xing) [Some
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Implementation of the PRC General Principles of Civil
Law (Trial)] Fa (Ban) Fa 1988 No. 6, art. 58.
84
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about this fact.89 The principle underlying Article 50 is the doctrine of
apparent authority, which is a principle of agency law.90
It is also possible to conceptualize the legal representative as an agent
of the company for litigational purposes, at least once the broader notion of
agency is adopted. A person who engages another person to conduct
proceedings on that person’s behalf will be bound by the consequence of the
litigation so conducted.91 It is, therefore, conceptually possible to treat the
person who conducts legal proceedings on behalf of another person as the
agent of the latter-mentioned person.92 It is generally accepted in China that
the relationship between a litigant and a person who conducts the litigant’s
civil proceedings is governed by the principles of agency.93
In a civil law jurisdiction, a person who has the power to conduct the
corporate proceedings can be technically treated as a statutory agent of the
company for the purpose of civil litigation. The 1992 Code of Civil
Procedure of Japan, for example, expressly provides that its provisions on
statutory agents94 are applicable mutatis mutandis to the representative of a
legal person,95 and a statutory agent of a person without litigation capacity
shall be appointed pursuant to, among other things, the provisions of the
Civil Code.96
If the legal representative does not constitute one of the company’s
organs and if it is conceptually and technically possible to regard the legal
representative as an agent of the company for both transactional and
litigational purposes, then in the absence of contrary provisions, the legal
representative should be viewed as an agent of the company.

89
Contract Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999,
effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 50, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (P.R.C.).
90
General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 66; MU XIAOYUAN, supra note 86, at 50.
91
MU XIAOYUAN, supra note 86, at 15.
92
There may be some difference between the role of a company’s legal representative and that of a
lawyer who is retained to conduct proceedings on behalf of the company. However, insofar as the act of
the legal representative in representing the company in its proceedings binds the company, the nature of the
relationship between the company and the legal representative is comparable to that between the company
and a litigation agent.
93
WEI ZHENYING, MINFA [CIVIL LAW] 171-72 (2000); MINFAXUE [CIVIL LAW] 247 (Kou Zhixin
ed., 1998); MINFAXUE [CIVIL LAW] 142 (Zheng Li & Wang Zuotang eds., 1995).
94
The phrase “statutory agent” is used here to mean a person who acts as a litigation agent for a
minor, an incompetent person, or half-incompetent person, etc. See MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure],
ch. III, sec. 1, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2300 (2005).
95
Id. art. 37.
96
Id. art. 28.
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RECENT CASES AFFIRM THAT THE GENERAL MEETING CAN BE GIVEN
CONTROL OVER A COMPANY’S LITIGATION

Several cases decided since 2002 demonstrate the need to recognize
the representative power of the general meeting. These cases illustrate that
the general meeting’s power of representation may be at issue when the
company needs to make and/or implement decisions respecting litigation and
both the board of directors and the validly registered legal representative are
unavailable. A validly registered legal representative may be unavailable for
the following reasons: the previous legal representative has been removed
but no replacement has been made yet, the attempted registration for the
replacement legal representative is invalid, the registration of the
replacement legal representative has not been completed, the legal
representative is physically unavailable, or the legal representative’s
qualifications to continue as the legal representative are in doubt.
A.

Case Study: When the Previous Legal Representative Has Been
Removed but No Replacement Has Been Appointed

During the interim between the removal of a company’s previous legal
representative and the appointment of his or her replacement, the company
does not have a legal representative. In this situation, the people’s courts
have shown a willingness to permit the general meeting to make a decision
to litigate on behalf of the company where the board of directors is not in a
position to act.
This principle is demonstrated in Jiangsu Cold Roll-Forming Steel
Association v. Wang Xigen,97 although the court did not base its judgment on
the recognition of the general meeting’s power of representation.98 In
Jiangsu, the two plaintiff companies founded Jiangsu Province Jinxing Cold
Roll-Forming Steel Commodities Sales Co. (“Jinxing”) in September 1996.99
The plaintiff companies were the only two shareholders in Jinxing.100 Wang
Xigen was appointed as the chairperson of Jinxing’s board of directors, as
the company's legal representative, and as its general manager.101
The company did not, however, operate properly under Wang’s
management. On March 25, 2002, the board of directors purportedly held a
97

REN MIN FA YUAN AN LI XUAN 2005 DI 2 JI [SELECTED CASES OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS 2005,
2] 223-27 (Sup. People’s Ct. China Applied Legal Studies Research Inst. ed., People’s Court
Press, 2006) [hereinafter Wang].
98
Id.
99
Id. at 223.
100
Id. at 224.
101
Id. at 223.
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meeting in which they resolved that Wang be discharged from all positions
he previously held in Jinxing and that he return the company’s financial
books, company seal, and other company property in his possession within
two days.102 No replacement legal representative, however, was appointed
after the meeting. A similar resolution was subsequently passed in a second
general meeting demanding that Wang return the company’s property and
the company seal within five days.103 Despite being notified, Wang failed to
attend either of the two meetings.104 Wang further refused to comply with
the resolutions of both the board and the general meeting.105 The company’s
two shareholders brought an action against Wang to recover Jinxing’s
property.106
The trial court dismissed the action because both the purported board
meeting and the general meeting suffered from procedural defects.107 The
court pointed out that Articles 43 and 48 of the 1993 Company Law required
general meetings be chaired by the chairperson of the board of directors, and
that board meetings similarly be called and chaired by the chairperson of the
board.108 Both the board meeting and the general meeting of Jinxing,
however, were not called or chaired by Wang.109
The appellate court, the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court, upheld
the shareholders appeal.110 The court ruled that the resolutions of both the
board and the general meeting were effective and ordered Wang to return the
company property within ten days.111 The court reasoned that although both
the board meeting and the general meeting suffered from minor procedural
defects, the resolutions of the two meetings, the content of which was
lawful, reflected the will and intentions of the shareholders.112
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court appeared concerned
about the nature of the action, even though the issue of the plaintiff’s
standing was quite apparent. The cause of action belonged to the company,
yet the plaintiffs were the company’s only two shareholders rather than the
company itself. This might suggest that the action be considered a
derivative action, but a closer reading reveals that it is not.
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 226.
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The 1993 Company Law did not provide for derivative actions.113
The circumstances and the manner under which a derivative action could be
brought were provided in the relevant guidelines issued by the higher
people’s court of the individual province or of the municipality with
provincial status.114 The guidelines issued by the Higher People’s Court of
Jiangsu province,115 where the Jiangsu case was decided, stipulated that a
shareholder might bring a derivative action only when the company was
113
In practice, however, derivative actions were permitted before the enactment of the 2005
Company Law, which provides for such actions. Derivative actions taken before January 1, 2006 were
based on a judicial interpretation provided by the Supreme People’s Court in 1994 entitled, Zui gao ren min
fa yuan guan yu zhong wai he zi jing ying qi ye dui wai fa sheng jing ji he tong jiu fen, kong zhi he ying qi
ye de wai fang yu mai fang you li hai guan xi, he ying qi ye de zhong fang ying yi shei de ming yi xiang ren
min fa yuan qi su wen ti de fu han [Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on When Chinese-Foreign Equity
Joint Venture Has an External Controversy over Economic Contract, and the Foreign Side Which Controls
the Joint Venture, Has Direct-Interest Relations with the Seller, in Whose Name Shall the Chinese Side of
the Joint Venture File a Lawsuit to the People’s Court] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 4,
1994), CHINALAWINFO, dispatch no.: fa jing [1994] 269 hao (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (P.R.C.). In the
above-mentioned judicial interpretation, the Supreme People’s Court expressed the view that, where the
board of directors had made a decision not to sue a party who was connected to the controller of the
company and who had injured the interests of the company, a shareholder should be permitted to take an
action on behalf of the company. The judicial interpretation, however, did not mention whether the action
should be taken in the shareholder’s own name. It was not necessary to do so, given that the contract in the
case in question contained an arbitration clause and the Supreme People’s Court expressed the view that the
dispute should be resolved through arbitration, not a court action. For a case where derivative actions were
allowed under the previous company law regime, see Dong shi zhang de xing wei sun hai gong si li yi, gu
dong shi fou you quan xiang qi ti qi su song? [Does an individual shareholder have the right to sue the
chairperson of the board of directors where the chairperson has injured the interests of the company?] in 2
YI FA SHUO FA—GONG SI HE HUO JIU FEN AN LI [DISCUSSING LAW THROUGH THE LAW—CASES ON
COMPANY AND PARTNERSHIP DISPUTES] 182-85 (Wang Ming & Song Caifa eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Individual Shareholder]. See also Yan Gengbin, Dui yi qi gu dong pai sheng su song an de fa lü fen xi [A
Legal Analysis of a Case on Derivative Actions] in GONG SI FA YI NAN WEN TI JIE XI [ANALYSIS ON
DIFFICULT COMPANY LAW ISSUES] 204 (Qi Qi & Zhou Bihua eds., 2d ed. 2005). It has always been
recognized in China that a company’s right can only be enforced by the company itself, and derivative
actions were and are permitted only where the company fails to exercise the right. See Individual
Shareholder, supra at 184. On the right of shareholders to take derivative actions under the current
company law regime, see 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 152.
114
See, e.g., Shanghai shi gao ji ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li she ji gong si su song an jian ruo gan
wen ti de chu li yi jian (yi) [Shanghai High People’s Court’s Opinions on the Adjudication of Company
Law Cases (one)] (Shanghai High People’s Ct., June 12, 2003), § 1(5), available at
http://www.luxinlaw.com/News/Show.asp?id=1382 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.); Jiangsu sheng gao
ji ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li shi yong gong si fa an jian ruo gan wen ti de yi jian (shi xing) (yi)
[Jiangsu Province High People’s Court Opinions on the Adjudication of Company Law Cases (trial) (one)]
(Jiangsu
Province
High
People’s
Ct.,
Jun.
3,
2003),
§
17,
available
at
http://www.lawyerwu.com/data/2005/0907/article_1120.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Jiangsu Opinion]; Beijing shi gao ji ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li gong si jiu fen an jian ruo
gan wen ti de zhi dao yi jian (shi xing) [Beijing High People’s Court Guiding Opinions on the Adjudication
of Company Law Cases (trial)] (Beijing High People’s Ct., Feb. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.ny148.cn/main/news_view.asp?newsid=1133 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.). These court
opinions are reprinted in BEIJING HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT, GONG SI FA XIN XING YI NAN AN LI PAN JIE [A
STUDY OF THE NEW AND COMPLICATED COMPANY LAW CASES] 281-99 (2006).
115
Jiangsu Opinion, supra note 114, § 17.
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unable, or otherwise failed, to take action against a senior company officer
or a controlling shareholder who had allegedly injured the interests of the
company. The guideline also stated, “[t]he company shall be joined in the
action as a third party.”116
A people’s court may allow a third party to join a proceeding where
the outcome of the litigation will affect the interests of the third party.117
Where this occurs, the name of the third party participating in the action will
normally appear in the court judgment.118 In Jiangsu, there was no
indication that the company itself was unable, or otherwise failed, to take
action against Wang before the proceeding was commenced. In addition,
Jinxing’s name is not recorded in the judgment of the case, proving that the
company did not join the action as a third party. The proceeding, therefore,
could not have been a derivative action.
It is also impossible to view the action against Wang as having been
brought by Jinxing’s board of directors. The plaintiffs were not directors of
Jinxing even though they each nominated a director to the board.119 Nor did
the purported board meeting on March 25, 2002 result in a decision to take a
legal action against Wang.120
The proceedings of the Jiangsu case can, however, be considered as
having been authorized and raised by the general meeting because the two
plaintiffs were the only shareholders of the company.121 Although the
general meeting was not held to specifically make a decision on the
commencement of the action against Wang, the result of such a meeting,
even if held, would be the same.122 If the purported general meeting on
April 15, 2002 could not be rendered ineffective based on procedural
defects, as the court held,123 then the lack of such a procedure should not bar
viewing the shareholders’ decision as a decision of the general meeting.
Indeed, under the 2005 Company Law, unanimous consent by the

116

Id. (emphasis added).
Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991,
effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 56, translated in 4 P.R.C. LAWS 185, 196 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law].
118
Interview with Sun Jian Han, Judge, Huzhou Intermediate People’s Court (Nov. 1, 2006).
119
See Wang, supra note 97, at 224.
120
Id. at 224-25.
121
Id. at 224.
122
This is the position taken by common law courts. See, e.g., Justice Neville’s observation in
Marshall’s Valve Gear Company, Ltd. v. Manning Wardle & Co. Ltd., (1909) 1 CH 267, 272 (U.K.).
123
The problems caused by requiring that the general meeting be called by the board of directors and
be chaired by the chairperson of the board under the prior Company Law have been recognized and
remedied under the 2005 Company Law. Under Article 41, where the board of directors and the board of
supervisors refuse to call for a general meeting, such a meeting can be called and chaired by shareholders
holding ten percent or more voting rights. 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 41.
117
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shareholders is the equivalent to a decision of the general meeting, even if
no general meeting has been held.124
In Jiangsu, the court appears to have recognized the representative
power of the general meeting. The court’s approval of an action brought by
the only shareholders of the company, which, as stated previously,125 can be
seen as an action commenced by the general meeting, must be based on the
court’s recognition of the general meeting’s representative power.
As discussed in Part IV, there is no doctrinal barrier to recognizing the
general meeting’s representative power. The legal representative can be
treated as the company’s agent in litigation. When this agent is unavailable
or ineffective, the company should be able to act on its own behalf through
one of its organs, such as the general meeting. Even if the legal
representative functions as the company’s “implementation organ,” where
the original implementation organ is ineffective or unavailable, a decisionmaking organ should be able to implement its own decision through another
servant or a lawyer.
From a doctrinal perspective, is it more desirable to insist on having
the action brought by the company’s new legal representative, once
appointed, rather than allowing the general meeting to represent the
company? Probably not. There is often a temporal gap between the
company’s decision to change its legal representative and the amending of
the BICA legal representative registration. Denying the general meeting’s
power to represent the company in such a situation may deprive the
company of its ability to control its own litigation during the temporal gap.
A suspension of the company’s ability to defend its interests and vindicate its
rights through legal proceedings may cause injury to the interests of the
company and its investors. It may also have the effect of holding up
commercial activities and hampering economic development.
The
circumstances involving such a temporal gap are discussed in the next two
cases.
B.

Case Study: When the Attempted Registration of the Replacement
Legal Representative Is Invalid

An attempted registration of the replacement legal representative may
be invalid if the company does not follow prescribed procedures. When this
occurs, the company does not have a legal representative because the
previous legal representative has been removed and a replacement has not
124
125

Id. art. 38.
See supra text accompanying note 121.
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been appointed. In these cases, the people’s courts have tended to recognize
the general meeting’s power to exercise control over corporate decisions on
conducting legal proceedings.
This is illustrated in Yan Yu Cheng v. Nanjing Shihua Construction
Supervision Co.126 Nanjing Shihua Construction Supervision Co. (“Shihua”)
was incorporated as a limited liability construction company on January 28,
2000.127 The four initial shareholders of the company were Yan, the
appellant in the case, Fang Xuechu, Yang Lisheng and Xi Yang Yang
Enterprise Co.128 Yan, being the majority shareholder, was elected as the
executive director and the legal representative of the company at Shihua’s
first general meeting.129
At the second general meeting held on August 14, 2000, the company
passed a resolution to reorganize the company’s shareholding and
organizational structures.130 The meeting resolved to establish a board of
directors and appointed Wang Liangxi, not Yan, to be the chairperson of the
board of directors and the company’s legal representative.131
All
shareholders, except Yan, signed the minutes of this meeting.
On September 16, 2000, Yan chaired a shareholders’ office meeting
(gudong bangong huiyi) attended by Fang and Yang.132 The meeting
resolved that, inter alia, Yan needed more time to consider the resolution of
the second general meeting. This same meeting further resolved that if the
three attendees of the office meeting failed to reach a consensus on the
rearrangement of the company’s capital structure by September 22, 2000, the
resolution of the second general meeting should be implemented.133 On
September 18, Yan informed the general meeting in writing that he wished to
withdraw his contribution towards the company’s registered capital and to
resign from all posts he held within the company.134
On September 22, the third general meeting resolved to accept Yan’s
resignation and reconfirm the resolution of the second general meeting to
126
Nanjing Shihua jian she gong cheng jian li you xian gong si su Yan Yucheng dong shi sun hai
gong si li yi an [Nanjing Shihua Const. Project Supervision Co. v. Dir. Yan Yucheng RE harming company
interests], ZHONGGUO SHEN PAN AN LI YAO LAN (2003 NIAN SHANG SHI SHEN PAN AN LI JUAN) [A
COLLECTION OF CHINESE TRIAL CASES (2003 COMMERCIAL CASES COLLECTION)] 226 (2004) (Nanjing
Interm. People’s Ct, 2002) [hereinafter Shihua].
127
Id.
128
Id. at 227.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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appoint Wang as the chairperson of the board and as the company’s legal
representative.135 Accordingly, Shihua submitted an application to BICA to
update the registration of the company’s legal representative.136 BICA
approved the application on December 13, 2000.137 The general meeting
held its fourth meeting on December 29, 2001 and again resolved to reaffirm
the validity of the resolution passed in the second general meeting on the
change of legal representative.138
Shihua then requested several times in vain that Yan return, in
particular, the company’s registration certificates and the company seal.139
In June 2001, Wang, in his capacity as the company’s legal representative,
commenced a legal proceeding against Yan to recover the company’s
property.140 The trial court ordered Yan to return to Shihua company
property that was in his possession, reasoning that the legal rights of a duly
incorporated company were protected by law.141
Yan appealed the case to the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court on
the grounds that, inter alia: 1) Shihua used a false seal to execute the
statement of claim (as the original seal was still in the possession of the
defendant, Yan), and 2) the trial court erred by validating Wang’s
appointment as chairperson of the board of directors (and hence the legal
representative) of the company.142 Yan further alleged that the resolution of
the second general meeting regarding Wang’s appointment as chairperson of
the board contravened Order No. 16 of the Ministry of Construction.143
Order No. 16 provided that to change the legal representative of a
construction supervision company, the company must complete the
replacement procedures through an original qualifying department before
applying to BICA.144 Shihua, however, did not complete the preliminary
reappointment procedures before filing to change the legal representative
registration with BICA,145 making the appointment of Wang as Shihua’s
legal representative arguably invalid.146

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 226, 228-29.
Id. at 226, 228.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 229.
Id.
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It followed, argued the appellant, that whether Wang was capable of
initiating a proceeding on behalf of the company was uncertain.147 The
respondent replied that Shihua’s general meeting had replaced the appellant
with Wang as the company’s legal representative through lawful
procedures.148 The respondent also argued that it was the company’s will
and intention to change its legal representative and to commence the
proceeding against the appellant.149
The appellate court dismissed Yan’s appeal on the ground that
commencing the proceeding against the appellant was the company’s will
and intention, which was formed and expressed by the company’s general
meeting.150 The court observed that Shihua, as a limited liability company,
was entitled to determine who had the right to custody of its certificates and
company seal.151 The court pointed out that the crux of the case was not
whether Wang was able to act as the company’s legal representative in
relation to the proceeding against Yan, but whether it was the company’s true
will and intention to commence the legal action.152
The court reasoned that a company’s will and intention are expressed
by its organs.153 In general, a company’s will and intention can be evidenced
by the signature of the company’s legal representative and the company
seal.154 In special circumstances, such as where there is friction among
shareholders, or, as in Shihua, a change of legal representative, or where the
effect of the two different seals is in question, the general meeting has the
power to represent the company to express the company’s will and
intention.155 This is because the general meeting is the company’s supreme
power organ and its resolutions are binding on all shareholders.156
The appellate court also pointed out that both the second and fourth
general meetings resolved by a two-thirds majority to relieve the appellant
from his position as the company’s legal representative and to require him to
return company property that was in his possession.157 This meant that
taking an action against the appellant was the will and intention of Shihua,
rather than the personal will of Wang, who purported to act as the legal
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
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representative of the company.158 Shihua’s power to commence legal
proceedings, therefore, was not affected by whether Wang could be
appointed as the legal representative of the company or whether the
registration of the new legal representative was valid.159
Theoretically, the court did not need to determine the general
meeting’s representative power to decide the case. The same result could
have been reached by curing the procedural defects relating to Wang’s
appointment. This could have been done, for example, by undoing the BICA
registration of Wang as the company’s legal representative and asking the
company to complete the pre-registration approval procedures as required
under Order No. 16 before re-lodging the change of legal representative
registration with BICA. The court had general power to stay proceedings
under the PRC Civil Procedure Law.160 The court could, therefore, have
chosen to stay the proceeding to allow time to remedy the defects in Wang’s
appointment. Once Wang had been properly appointed by curing the
procedural defects, the proceeding could have been resumed as originally
planned.
A broad ruling on the general meeting’s representative power,
however, makes better sense. It takes time to cure the procedural defects
relating to the reappointment of a legal representative. An order to stay
proceedings would leave a temporal gap between the dismissal of the legal
representative and the finalization of the process to approve and register the
replacement. For this reason, the court's determination of the general
meeting’s representative power will help protect the interests of the company
and its investors as well as promote commercial activities.
Doctrinally, the court’s judgment in Shihua was sound. The judgment
was based squarely on its decision that the general meeting has the power to
represent a company in litigation proceedings. As previously discussed in
Part IV, there was no doctrinal barrier to recognizing the representative
power of the general meeting for litigation purposes.
The case did not, however, mention whether the board of directors,
established pursuant to the resolution of the second general meeting, had
reached any resolution on the commencement of the action against Yan.
Assuming that the board held a meeting and reached a resolution on this
matter, perhaps the reason the court did not rely on the resolution was
because the replacement legal representative—who must be the chairperson
158
159
160

Id.
Id.
Civil Procedure Law, supra note 117, art. 136(6).
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of the board161—was not first approved by the qualification control
department as required under Order No. 16.162 Thus, there was no properly
appointed chairperson of the board, and no board meeting can be held
without a chairperson.163
C.

Case Study: When the Registration of the Replacement Legal
Representative Has Not Been Completed

The previous two cases involved circumstances where the company
did not have a legal representative to represent itself. A similar situation
occurs when the replacement of the representative has been made, but the
registration of the replacement has not been completed. This was the
situation that the court in Shanghai Tongxin Pharmaceutical Co. v. Shanghai
Public Housing Assets Management Co. (“Shanghai”) encountered.164 The
plaintiff entered into a land use right transfer contract with the defendant.165
Zhou Guozhu, the legal representative and the chairperson of the board of
directors, executed the agreement on behalf of the plaintiff company.166
Subsequently, a major change in shareholding took place.167 As a result, a
new board chairperson and legal representative, Zhang Xinguo, was
appointed.168 Before the change of the BICA registration regarding the
replacement of the board chairperson and legal representative was
completed, Zhou sought to rescind the land use right transfer contract.169
The general meeting of the plaintiff company, held with the new
shareholders in attendance, decided that the action commenced by Zhou was
inconsistent with the best interest of the company and that the proceeding
should be dropped.170 The application for the discontinuation of proceedings
was executed with the signature of Zhang, the new legal representative,
whose name had not appeared in the relevant registry.171 At the time the
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1993 Company Law, supra note 24, art. 45.
Shihua, supra note 126, at 228.
163
1993 Company Law, supra note 24, arts. 48, 114.
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Shen Li, You gu dong hui jue ding de fa ding dai biao ren ying ju you gong si de su song dai biao
quan [The Legal Representative Appointed by the General Meeting Should Have Power of Representation],
http://www.companylawyer.com.cn/gdqy/zxgdqydbh/20051215113225.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2007)
(Shanghai Mun. First Interm. People’s Ct.) [hereinafter Shanghai].
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application for discontinuation of proceedings was made, the abovementioned change of registration had still not been completed.172
The commentator on this case viewed the application for
discontinuation as valid on the basis that the failure to complete the
registration of the new legal representative only affected the quality of the
publicity generated from the relevant company information, not the actual
effect of the legal representative’s replacement in the company.173
It is arguable whether a failure to complete registration will affect the
legal representative’s replacement in the company. The person appointed as
legal representative is only qualified to represent the company when the
BICA registration has been completed.174 When the application for
discontinuation was made in Shanghai, the company did not have a validly
registered legal representative, given that Zhou, the previous legal
representative, had already been removed. This means that the court’s
decision to approve the company’s discontinuation application relied entirely
on the strength of the general meeting’s resolution. The court's decision was
based on the recognition of the general meeting’s representative power.
Zhang’s power of representation, if any, was granted by the general meeting.
If Zhang had played a role in the discontinuation application, he would have
acted as the delegate of the general meeting, rather than the company’s legal
representative, because he had not been registered with BICA as such.
D.

Case Study: When the Legal Representative Is Physically Unavailable
or the Ability to Act as the Legal Representative Is in Doubt

The question of a general meeting’s power of representation may also
crop up where the company’s legal representative is unavailable or where the
ability to act as the company’s legal representative is in doubt. This can
occur, for example, when the legal representative is under police custody.
The recent case of Wanhong Co. v. Beimai Import and Export Co.
(“Wanhong”)175 illustrates that the court may be willing to recognize the
general meeting’s power to litigate under these circumstances, even though
172

Id.
Id. The case commentator is Shen Li, an Assistant Judge of the Second Civil Law Division of
Shanghai Higher People’s Court, where the case was decided. There is therefore reason to believe that
Shen’s view is that of the court.
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Enterprise’s Legal Representative] (promulgated by St. Admin. for Indus. and Commerce, June 23, 1999),
art. 3 CHINALAWINFO (last visited Jan. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.).
175
Wanhong Co. v. Beimai Imp./Exp. Co., Beidahuang Wheat Industry Co., and Longxing
Agricultural Development Co., (on file with Journal) (Haerbin Interm. People's Ct., Sept. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter Beidahuang].
173

MARCH 2008

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IN CHINA

319

the court in Wanhong appears to have erred by agreeing with the defendant’s
ungrounded argument regarding shareholders’ litigation rights.
The plaintiff company, the first defendant company, Heilongjiang
Province Beimai Import and Export Trading Co. (“Beimai”), and Danwei
Holdings Co. (“Danwei”) entered into an arrangement to jointly run an
export business.176 Under the agreement, the plaintiff was responsible for
obtaining a loan for the first defendant who was in charge of procuring the
goods to be exported.177 Danwei was to act as the guarantor for the loan.178
The second defendant, Heilongjiang Province Beidahuang Wheat Industry
Co. (“Beidahuang”), and the third defendant, Longxing Agricultural
Development Co. (“Longxing”), were the only shareholders in the first
defendant company, holding fifty-one percent and forty-nine percent of the
shares issued by the company, respectively.179 The general manager of
Beidahuang, which was the majority shareholder in Beimai, was appointed
as the legal representative of Beimai.180
It was alleged that the plaintiff company advanced a loan for RMB 17
million to Beimai in late 2002.181 The cooperative relationship between the
plaintiff and Beimai ended in early 2003 due to market fluctuation. 182 It was
alleged that the latter, Beimai, still owed the plaintiff company RMB 7
million. The plaintiff brought an action against Beimai for the remaining
debt and against Beidahung and Longxing for failing to contribute or
unlawfully withdrawing capital money in their capacity as shareholders.183
Evidence existed, however, that cast doubt on whether Beimai received the
allegedly loaned money from the plaintiff company and whether Beidahuang
and Longxing failed to contribute capital or had otherwise illegally
withdrawn the capital funds they had contributed.184
When the action commenced, Beimai was virtually non-existent.
Both the financial books and the company seal were missing.185 Its legal
representative was under police custody on a separate matter,186 and the
176
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company’s actual location was unknown.187 Thus, the legal representative,
or even the board, of Beimai was not in a position to defend the proceedings
on behalf of the company. Longxing was a fly-by-night company and could
also not be located.188 The only defendant that was worth suing was,
therefore, Beidahuang.
One of the questions presented by the case was whether Beidahuang,
the majority shareholder, could defend the proceedings on behalf of Beimai
on the issues brought before the court.189 The court answered this question
in the affirmative.190 The court reasoned that the majority shareholder had
standing to defend proceedings in the name of the company because a
shareholder could take a derivative action against a defaulting company
officer to vindicate the company’s rights.191
While the result of the court’s judgment on this issue is justifiable, the
basis of the judgment is questionable. In a derivative action, the shareholder
who initiates a proceeding does so in her own name, rather than in the name
of the company, against the person who has allegedly harmed the company.
The court normally allows the company to join as a party in the litigation so
that the company may be bound by the benefit of the judgment.192 The
company itself is not, however, a claimant in such an action, as it has not
consented to the action.193
Proceedings against the company, on the other hand, can only be
defended by the company itself. This means that only a person who has the
power to represent the company has standing to defend proceedings in the
name of the company. This person is, in ordinary circumstances, the legal
representative of the company.194 A shareholder does not have this
representative power and does not have the standing to defend an action
against the company.
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Despite the court’s mistake in determining the extent of the
shareholder’s right, the court would have reached the same result had it
taken into account the general meeting’s power to control corporate actions.
As previously discussed, there are no doctrinal or practical barriers to
allowing the general meeting to have control over corporate proceedings
where the board of directors and the legal representative are both
unavailable. In Wanhong, the Beidahuang was a majority shareholder,
holding fifty-one percent of the issued shares.195 It would have been able to
pass an ordinary resolution, which simply requires a majority of votes, at the
general meeting with respect to the litigation.
The plaintiff company would naturally have rejected this view by
arguing that no general meeting resolution could have existed if no general
meeting had been held. This argument can, however, be countered. Where
it is physically or practically impossible for the shareholders to hold such a
general meeting, the failure to hold the meeting cannot deprive the majority
shareholders of their ability to form the will and intention of the company.
The Jinling court upheld the effect of a resolution from a general meeting
despite procedural defects.196 This is because the defects were caused by the
defaulting board chairperson who actually refused to call and chair the
meeting.197
By parity of reasoning, where the chairperson of the board and the
only other shareholder are unavailable because they are under police custody
or have simply disappeared, the impossibility of convening a general
meeting should not affect the majority shareholder’s power to make
decisions about litigation proceedings on behalf of the company.198 The
result of such a meeting, if held, would be a foregone conclusion.199
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CONCLUSION

The company representation mechanism is only functional when a
person capable of representing the company is available. Such a person is
unavailable when the person granted the power of representation is unable to
faithfully perform duties or is physically unavailable. Ironically, the legal
representative mechanism under China’s company law regime often creates
situations where the legal representative is unavailable. Because the power
of representation is statutorily vested in a senior executive officer, the legal
representative’s performance is often self-biased. Furthermore, because the
power of representation is vested in a single person, the company’s
competence in controlling its legal proceedings is often questioned when the
legal representative is physically unavailable or when the representative has
not delegated his or her power of representation to another.200 The
requirement that the appointment of the legal representative must be
approved by and registered with the company registration authority often
creates a temporal gap between the appointment and the subsequent
processes with the registration authority.201
The unavailability of a company’s legal representative often places the
courts in a dilemma between requiring compliance with the formal rules of
legal representation and the substantive need for giving effect to the
intentions of the company and enabling it to resolve disputes or defend its
interests through court proceedings. The courts in the cases discussed in this
Article demonstrate a consistent willingness to prefer the latter to the former.
However, the courts have not always been able to identify and articulate the
correct doctrinal basis for their decisions.
The cases discussed in Part V demonstrate that the issues in each case
can all be resolved on the basis of the general meeting’s power to control
corporate proceedings. Following the justifications discussed in Parts IV
and V, when a company’s representative mechanism is dysfunctional, the
general meeting should be regarded as having decision-making and
representation powers over legal proceedings. The general meeting’s power
to control company litigation can, therefore, serve as a doctrinal basis to
retain the litigational power of the company when the company’s board of
directors or the legal representative is unavailable or incompetent. The
general meeting’s representative power should only be exercisable when a
legal representative is unavailable, or otherwise incapable of discharging his
or her role in an unbiased manner.
200
201
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With the general meeting’s power to control corporate actions, the
inherent deficiency of the legal representative system will be cured.
Additionally, Chinese companies will be able to enhance their ability to
settle disputes and protect their interests through legal proceedings. More
importantly, this will help strengthen corporate governance under the current
company law regime by providing an additional avenue through which the
company may seek to enforce its senior officers’ duties. Since case
precedent does not have binding force in China,202 the recognition of the
general meeting’s power to control company proceedings may be formalized
by inserting a provision in the 2005 Company Law, or more realistically, by
Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation on this issue.203
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